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Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation of the People 
by John Milbank (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2013), viii + 269 pp. 
In the recent film The Man who Knew Infinity, based on a biography of the same name by 
Robert Kanigel, the Cambridge mathematician G.H. Hardy tries to cut the rough diamond 
Srinivasa Ramanujan (1887-1920) into a gem that meets the exacting Western standards of 
scientific taste. The subsequent drama between the Indian natural talent and the English 
member of the educated class exemplifies a clash of cultures. Western mathematicians only 
appreciate insights that can be formally proven. Ramanujan, by contrast, relies on his 
startling religious intuition, and rejects the request to carry this burden. Only after his 
conversation partners succeed in detecting a mathematical flaw in the labyrinthine pile of 
his theorems, does he accept that they might have a point. According to the historical 
witnesses, Ramanujan’s methods were terse, bewildering and unconventional, scarcely 
comprehensible to academics who were unaccustomed to his mind-blowing intellectual 
gymnastics. Yet, Hardy had already conjectured, after his first examinations of 
Ramanujan’s notebooks, his theorems ‘must be true, because, if they were not true, no one 
would have the imagination to invent them’. According to the American mathematician 
Bruce Carl Berendt, nearly all of his theorems have meanwhile been proven ‘correct’.  
This historical example sheds light on my experience of reading John Milbank’s 
books. Milbank has accepted that his objectors might occasionally have a point. Yet, 
despite numerous and frequently caviling attempts to ‘refute’ his theories, his research has 
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turned out to be astonishingly consistent with the most recent Francophone research on the 
genealogy of our modern age, represented by such figures as Alain de Libera and Olivier 
Boulnois. It seems Milbank’s theories are closer to the truth than his critics were ready 
admit. 
In his recent publication Milbank has presented a kind of synthesis of his writings 
that revisits his 1991 criticism of ‘secular reason’. This book is likely to become ‘the 
cardinal text for interpreting him and arguing with him’ – as Oliver O’Donovan puts it in 
his cover blurb. It is partitioned in two parts: the first unpacks his genealogy of modern 
representationalism (The Representation of Being), and the second deepens it based on a 
genealogy of the (undeniable) crisis of Western democracies (The Representation of the 
People).  
Milbank’s bewildering writing style has to do with his Ramanujanesque synoptic 
intuition: His thinking builds simultaneously on the phenomenological commitment to 
provide a rich account of our life-world experience, and a genealogical method that 
recovers the forgotten aspirations of the past as resources for a radical reconceptualisation 
of the washed-out patterns of thinking of our present time. For this reason, his book is 
almost unreadable for philosophers who are not deeply rooted in the history of Western 
thinking; and it will probably prove equally indigestible for historians of philosophy who 
are not firmly grounded in the philosophical discussions of our present time. 
To get an idea of the overall outline of Milbank’s book, we might focus on the four 
pillars of modern philosophy, discussed in the first part – univocity, representation, 
possibilism, concurrence – and the four ontological layers that characterize his political 
genealogy of the ‘human animal’ in the second part: namely our unique features as 
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‘rational animals’, ‘social animals’, ‘fabricating and political animals’ and ‘supernatural 
animals’.  
According to Milbank, our declining liberal age was the upshot of an increasing 
externalisation of the ‘animal’ part of our nature. If we focus, to begin with, on the fate of 
the ‘rational animal’, this becomes evident as soon as we recall the subject-object dualism 
that undergirds the ‘epistemology’ of post-Cartesian philosophy. Since the other pillars are 
derivative to this focal pillar, I will read the first part of Milbank’s book somewhat against 
the grain, and put the pillar of representation first. 
When it comes to representation, Milbank opposes the modern concept of 
‘epistemology’ to an Aristotelian and Platonic ontology of ‘knowledge by identity’, and 
supports this opposition with a creative appropriation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. If we put 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology into an Aristotelian framework, we might say 
that our cognitive capacities as rational animals are designed to actualize hitherto unknown 
potentials of our environment. A falcon or a dog actualise a different world than we 
humans do. Yet our cognitive capacities are in continuity with their sensual life: Like 
animals we are responsive to our environment. Even our mental capacity to actualize 
abstract forms (in the sense of Aristotle’s species intelligibilis) is fundamentally 
responsive. I do not experience an ‘internal representation’ in my head of the cherry tree 
out there. My ability to recognize it as a flowering, rose-coloured instantiation of the 
species of cherry trees is afforded by the tree itself. As Milbank puts it: ‘the thing known is 
the fulfilment of the thing as merely existing’ (59). 
However, in the wake of Augustine and Aquinas, Milbank goes a significant step 
beyond this Aristotelian ontology of knowledge: Our knowledge of things is ‘qualified by a 
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kind of counter-teleology which is intentionality’ (59). This means, our response to our 
physical environment is always governed by subjective inclinations and the desire for the 
true, the beautiful and the good. Our ‘knowledge by identity’ is inextricably linked with 
modes of creative enactment that put our perceptions and cognitions ‘in perspective’. 
This creative feature of our mental life might be exemplified by Picasso’s painting 
Guernica. Picasso’s iconic depiction of violent destruction, that captures the crying out of 
suffering animals and people, changed our perception of war and genocide. Yet this change 
not only affected our subjective intuitions, it also enabled us to discover essential features 
of the real world that we inhabit. Artistic creations are more than ‘mere fictions’: they can 
change our understanding of the real world, and sensitise us for its true purpose.  
This revelatory feature of artistic fictions leads us straight to the core of Milbank’s 
criticism of the political representationalism of modernity in the second part. Modern 
societies tend to reduce artistic fictions, technological inventions, or social conventions to 
autonomously created parallel worlds. The latter might be used for their own sake, such as 
in modern art and entertainment, or in computer-generated ‘virtual realities’ in which we 
can ‘immerse’. Yet, they can also be used as representationalist means for extrinsic 
scientific or political ends. For example, we use ‘made up’ mathematical parallel worlds as 
scientific ‘means’ in order to represent (supposedly) ‘bare facts’; or we use them as 
political and economic tools in order control a ‘society reduced to measurable quanta’ (4). 
According to Milbank this representationalist constructivism is fatal, since the 
instrumental use of artifices almost inevitably inverts such that the artifices start to 
determine what they are supposed to depict. It is no accident that the post-political societies 
of our present time tend to replace engagement with the social reality of the people with 
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engagement with fictional media spectacles; or that they replace engagement with social 
problems with engagement with algorithms that reduce everything to a matter of 
‘functional, administrative necessity’ (176). In our universities, for example, we make great 
efforts to introduce quantifiable ‘quality assessment procedures’ that improve nothing but 
the artificially constructed representation of ‘quality’ without bothering about the 
underlying social reality of the students and academics. 
According to Milbank this use and misuse of ‘made up’ realities conceals that 
artifices are no neutral means. Fictions, conventions and artistic creations shape the 
realities that they represent. And this has normative implications: If their use is not 
governed by the prudential desire for the true, the beautiful and the good, it will inevitably 
turn into a plague that undermines our desire for a good life. Just as the species intelligibilis 
is ‘identical’ with the materialised form that it represents, because it participates in the life 
that it actualizes in our mind, so artistic or technological creations are ‘identical’ with the 
animal world that they represent, because they are an expression of the benevolent or 
malevolent inclinations and desires that govern this world.  
In accordance with this observation, Milbank characterises our human constitution 
as ‘transbiological’. Artifices are an essential feature of our animal nature, because they 
have the creative potential to actualize hitherto unknown potentialities of perception, 
cognition and action through inventions that add something to the ‘biological facts’. 
Consequently, fictions, artifices, and conventions should not be imposed on an animality 
that is mistakenly considered as ‘pure nature’, or replace our intuitive understanding of the 
world. Rather, they should augment the scope of our intuitions in a way that is in continuity 
with our animal desires, and our shared vision of a good life.  
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For this reason, Milbank attacks the modern inclination to use the ‘laws’ and 
‘conventions’ which govern our social, economic and political interactions, as a 
‘biopolitical’ means of surveillance and control (in the sense of Michael Foucault). Rather, 
the use of laws should be based on the principle of ‘equity’, which resists formalisation, 
and appeals to our faculty of judgement. Wise leadership and government can never be 
reduced to the ‘fair’ application of anonymised rules. Rather, it should be informed by the 
‘supernatural’ virtues of ‘pre-legal trust’ (faith), ‘patience’ (hope) and a ‘polity of 
friendship’ (love), and teleologically oriented to the organic actualisation of the common 
good.  
This leads us to the second pillar of modern philosophy: possibilism. Our modern 
mind-set emerged out of the counterintuitive assumption that the real world that we inhabit 
is an instantiation of a theoretically made up ‘possible world’. This is consistent with the 
representationalist, scientific conviction that we can elaborate mathematical ‘models’ of 
possible worlds, and then determine by empirical tests which ‘model’ comes closest to 
reality. Yet, examples like Picasso’s Guernica, the fall of the Berlin wall, or the Storming 
of the Bastille demonstrate that this cannot be right. Real events can change our 
perceptions, cognitions and actions in ways that cannot be anticipated by abstract 
permutations of possibilities or computer-simulations, because they transform our 
understanding of what is essential and what accidental. Hence, we have to recover 
Aquinas’s prioritisation of the actual against the possible: Our actual world is not an 
instantiation of a possible world, but inversely, every hitherto unknown possibility is a 
‘gift’ that is afforded to us by the ontologically saturated actual world that we inhabit. 
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The significance of the pillar of univocity (which comes first in Milbank’s book) is 
rooted in a particular feature of the above representationalist possibilism: the dogmatic 
assumption that the law of contradiction can never be suspended. Whatever ‘model’ 
modern scientists chose in order to represent the world, it typically has to meet the minimal 
requirement to be univocally ‘either A or non-A’ – in accordance with the Scotist tradition 
of the late Middle Ages, and in contrast to more thoughtful late medieval innovators like 
Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa. Consequently ‘there can be no “middle” in meaning 
between identity and difference – and therefore also … [no] irreducible meaning for poetic 
metaphor and any grounding of meaning in a depth which is not fully fathomable’ (51). 
Milbank’s ‘analogical’ alternative to this dogmatic position might be illustrated by 
the following two sentences: ‘My wife loves me’ and ‘My dog loves me’. It would be 
insulting to say ‘My wife loves me like my dog’. So, they are not ‘univocal’. Yet, our use 
of perfection term (like ‘love’) with regard to animals is not equivocal either (like the word 
‘bank’ in ‘river bank’ and ‘savings bank’). We would rather consider ‘animal love’ as the 
analogical actualisation of a phenomenon that manifests itself more perfectly on the higher 
level of human animals – and most properly in manifestations of the divine fullness of 
being.  
According to this interpretation of perfection terms, the emergence of ‘human 
animals’ in our universe actualised possibilities that no lower creature would have been 
able to anticipate: their actuality preceded the possibilities that they afforded. 
Consequently, perfection terms like ‘being’ and ‘goodness’ (or ‘love’) cannot be reduced to 
a univocally recognisable core of meaning that differs only in quantitative terms. God is 
not a person like me, ‘only infinitely more perfect than the latter’ – for the same reason 
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why my wife is not an animal like my dog, ‘only infinitely more perfect than the latter’. 
The emergence of higher modes of being always has the character of a transformative event 
that reveals radically new possibilities. And this means, perfection terms have an 
irreducible poetic core: they account for similarities between unique creatures that are 
unaccountable in non-paradoxical, univocal terms – as Cusa and Eckhart argued in their 
post-Scotist attempts to recover the ontological realism of Aquinas (100-105). 
If we want to understand this ontology of transformative events more clearly, we 
have to turn to the last pillar of modern philosophy: the concept of causation as 
concurrence. According to Milbank, the emergence of radically new possibilities cannot be 
derived from the synergistic interaction between ‘concurring’ causes – like the synergy 
between physical forces, or between form and matter in Kant’s account of the interaction 
between a priori and a posteriori principles that assured the modern dualism between 
subject and object. 
The significance of this point can be illustrated by the phenomenonology of human 
relationships. Milbank agrees with Emmanuel Levinas that there is an asymmetric ‘priority 
of the divine or human other in us’ (238). In phenomenological terms this means that the 
‘influence’ of the ‘other’ has the character of a ‘flowing in’: she has already intruded my 
subjective world before I have been able to determine what I am doing. I can never resist 
relating to the presence of another person, because her ‘influence’ precedes my intentional 
acts. Yet, this happens, not despite but precisely because the presence of the other 
actualises in me the potential to act as a rationally accountable social animal. In contrast to 
concurrent causes, ‘inflowing’ causes do not undermine but confirm my ability to act as a 
free subject. 
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Milbank goes beyond Levinas’s phenomenology of alterity in that he considers this 
possibility as a feature of our relationship to every created entity. Since every mode of 
knowledge is a kind of ‘knowledge by identity’ (and not ‘by representation’), every 
subjective response to our environment has the potential to actualise in us unanticipated 
possibilities. Moreover, unlike Levinas, this ‘influence’ ‘goes beyond any ontic contrast 
between giving and receiving’ (238) – it transcends the distinction between activity and 
passivity in every respect. If I discover at a certain turning point of my life the difference 
between my love for my dog and my love for a human person, then this event actualizes 
unprecedented potentialities on both sides of the subject-object-relation: it changes not only 
myself as a ‘subject’ that relates to an ‘object’, but also the object of my perception. Hence, 
the whole relationship has the character of a gift that is derived from the in-flowing of a 
transcendent cause.  
It comes as no surprise that this principle applies also to the influence of 
‘supernatural’ causes, as Aquinas still knew in the thirteenth century – in contrast to 
Luther, and the seventeenth-century de auxiliis controversy of Catholic theology (86, and 
226f.). According to Milbank, our secular world view emerged out of the assumption that 
every form of causation can be reduced to a kind of concurrence between real or formally 
distinct forces. The concept of concurrence undergirded controversies about the competing 
forces of human freedom and divine grace after the Reformation; it returned in 
considerations about political and economic forces in thinkers like Hobbes and Smith; it 
governed Kant’s considerations about the relationship between ‘empirical impressions’ and 
‘spontaneous subjective acts’, etc. Yet, according to Milbank, this counterintuitive 
reductive concept was invented by misguided late medieval clerics and theologians, and 
not by sober minded philosophers. Hence, it is time to return to a more realistic way of 
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thinking, if we want to recover a theologically qualified understanding of the creation that 
we inhabit. 
In the second part, Milbank unpacks this revised ontology by guiding his reader 
through almost all ramifications of the Western history of science, art, technology, politics 
and religion. The historical landscape that emerges during this forced march reminded me 
of the above quotation: ‘no one would have the imagination to invent it’. However, as a 
reviewer, I can only confine myself to delineating the key concept that governs Milbank’s 
attempts to retrieve an alternative to the ‘secular order’ of our present time: his concept of 
‘original supplementation’. 
While this concept is indebted to Jacques Derrida, it provides Milbank with the key 
to a properly Thomist, ‘integral’ account of our nature as ‘transbiological’ animals. As in 
the case of technological devices, integral supplements actualise ‘essential possibilities’ in 
that to which they are seemingly only ‘accidentally’ superadded – this is the paradox of 
supplementation. Milbank uses this concept not only in order to retrieve Aquinas’s 
understanding of social innovations and fictions as ‘figura veritatis’ (192), but also the 
ontological, gnoseological and theological principles of his philosophy. The concept of 
‘original supplementation’ characterizes Aquinas’s ‘real distinction’, where ‘being’ is 
superadded to an essential possibility although the latter could not ‘exist’ without this 
supplementation; it undergirds his account of the ‘rational animal’, where the light of the 
‘agent intellect’ is superadded to the soul as the form of the body although the latter would 
not be human without this addition, etc. Yet most importantly, an original supplementation 
governs Aquinas’s account of our supernatural destination, symbolized by ‘Christ the 
King’: The revelation of Christ as ‘priest and king’ added a supernatural reality to the 
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‘natural body’ of our social and political world, although the latter could never be ‘truly 
human’ without this super-addition.  
Milbank’s suggestion that we recover a concept of ‘mixed government’ that 
includes democratic, aristocratic and monarchic elements builds on a creative appropriation 
of the last thesis. And it goes without saying that this far-reaching suggestion needs further 
discussion – particularly in terms of his deconstruction of the modern mainstream 
distinction between ‘left wing’ and ‘right wing’ politics. In contrast to the Frankfurt School 
philosophers of the German post-war tradition, Milbank doubts that this distinction is still 
expedient. Yet, he does not simply abolish the ‘emancipatory legacy’ that inspired the 
‘redemptive criticism’ of the enlightenment tradition in the wake of Walter Benjamin, 
Theodor W. Adorno and Jürgen Habermas. Milbank’s ‘third way’ only questions the naive 
assumption that this distinction is self-evident. Unlike Habermas (‘Was links ist weiß doch 
jeder’), he insists that ‘both “truth to oneself” and the “truth to the witness of others” is a 
matter of constant discernment’ (264). Yet, he does not dispense with the ‘leftwards slant’ 
of a policy that aims at the ‘democratisation of virtue as love … and the expressive release 
and fulfilment of the entirety of human powers’ (269) His just published monograph The 
Politics of Virtue (together with Adrian Pabst) takes a further step on this path by going 
beyond a post-liberal rehash of a neo-Aristotelian ‘communitarianism’. In accordance with 
Habermas and the ‘counter-teleology’ of Augustine and Aquinas, Milbank’s ‘third way’ 
relies on our ‘emancipatory potential’ to transform our social, political and cultural life. 
Johannes Hoff 
